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Abstract 
 
Against the backdrop of the Estonian Presidency of the Council of the European Union 
in the second half of 2017 the authors propose to focus the political agenda on the threats 
to free trade which emerged by the protectionist views of the Trump government, the 
imminent weakening of the EU Common Market in course of the Brexit and the still 
lingering conflict with Russia which is accompanied by trade sanctions. The authors 
show how far the three Baltic States depend on trade with Russia, the United Kingdom 
and the USA by a share analysis of disaggregated trade flows and a gravity analysis of 
trade relations. The analyses reveal that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania could be affected 
negatively by all the three challenges to the free movements of goods and services. 
While they are still trading over-proportionally with Russia the attractiveness of UK and 
US markets for Baltic enterprises is already visible and these markets offer further 
development potential. Hence, the promotion of the concept of open markets would not 
only help bridging political divides but it would also foster the Baltic States’ gains from 
globalization and would reduce economic and political dependencies. 
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1. Estonian Presidency of the Council of the European Union: Agenda Setting 
When Estonia will take over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for 
the July to December 2017 term, the country will have to coordinate important 
European political initiatives in a period of increasing international tensions and 
uncertainties. The Estonian government started its process of defining its main 
political objectives for the Estonian presidency in 2014. As a starting point it chose 
the topics which were important for Estonia since its accession of the European Union 
in 2004. This catalogue comprised: the information society, the internal market and 
competitiveness, the environment, connection, employment and the European 
neighborhood policy (Riigikantselei 2014). At the same time, the Estonian 
government stated that it would pursue its agenda setting in accordance with the 
European Commission’s policy guidelines, which were published in 2014, too, and 
which are highlighting the Commission’s general objectives for the subsequent five 
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years.3 Comparing these catalogues of policy objectives renders a great number of 
similarities which will clearly shape the Estonian presidential agenda.  
In the recent past, however, European policy has been challenged by three incidents, 
which may sharpen the view on a specific topic: free trade. This topic did not 
materialize directly in the objectives catalogue, but was more or less implicitly 
assumed to be valid so far. But these three incidents might seriously challenge this 
assumption: 
(i) In 2014 the EU sanctions against Russia and Russian counter-sanctions were 
imposed in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis and impaired trade with Russia, 
particularly for its neighbors in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). 
(ii) In 2016 the British vote for a “Brexit” – the United Kingdom’s (UK) complete 
exit from the European Union – induced a shock in the EU, as it may entail 
severe consequences for trade with the UK, particularly in the case of a “hard” 
Brexit.  
(iii) Since the end of 2016 the announcement of the newly elected president of the 
United States, Donald Trump, to revise or even disengage all free trade 
agreements and to pursue a distinct protectionist and mercantilist policy in favor 
of the USA invoked the nightmare that the era of free trade advocated so far by 
the United States might come to an end.  
All three incidents are threatening the free movement of goods and services which 
have contributed to growth and wealth worldwide. Impaired trade relations with 
Russia are already visible in trade data, while the other two events might have an even 
greater impact on trade in Europe, given the UK’s and the US’s by far greater 
economic weight. 
The EU sanctions against Russia and the Russian countersanctions coincided with a 
deteriorating economic situation in Russia since 2012 caused by the shrinking oil 
prices and a sharp devaluation of the Ruble. One is inclined to attribute the lion’s share 
of the apparent slowdown of export and import flows with Russia to the country’s 
economic crisis, less to the sanctions which are no trade boycott at all and do not affect 
the trade in main commodity groups seriously. Therefore, it is the Russian crisis which 
has left its visible marks in BSR trade statistics.4 
In contrast, the British Brexit vote of June 23, 2016, could not yet leave any marks in 
trade statistics so far. Moreover, the actual exit will take several years, and it is not 
yet predictable how it will take place and which status as trading partner the United 
Kingdom will have vis-a-vis the EU. Nevertheless it seems plausible that the Brexit 
might influence trade relations in the BSR given the fact that the UK is a close 
neighbor to the BSR, only separated from it by the North Sea. 
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Even vaguer to envision are the consequences of the still not completely settled and 
thus only potential trade policy of US President Trump. But if Trump should proceed 
on his projected path to pursue policy “exclusively for the US” without any regard to 
the principles of free trade that governed US trade policy so far, the consequences 
might be substantial, even if his policy stance should not result in an open “trade war” 
as envisaged by some commentators. 
But anyway all three incidents fall into the category of “raising barriers to trade” 
which might affect trading partners world-wide. These impacts give a clear mandate 
to the Estonian presidency and its agenda to explicit advocate for free trade, a policy 
stance that is in accordance with Estonian economic policy anyway. In order to give 
some empirical support to this suggestion we will show in section 2, in how far the 
three Baltic States depend on trade with Russia, the UK and the USA in a descriptive 
way. In section 3 we will disaggregate trade flows with respect to commodities in 
order to identify the commodity groups where potential dependencies might be 
highest. In section 4 we will deploy a gravity model to systematically analyze trade 
relations with the three partners. Finally in section 5 we will draw conclusions on the 
importance of the free trade issue for the Estonian presidency. 
2. The Potential Impact of Russian Sanctions, the Brexit and US-Protectionism 
on Baltic Trade 
To what extent the three incidents described above may harm trade relations of the 
Baltic States, can approximately be predicted by analyzing the shares of exports and 
imports in the individual countries’ trade with Russia, the United Kingdom and the 
USA. Figures 1 to 3 exhibit the shares of the three partners in Baltic exports and in 
imports. 
With respect to exports we find a common feature in the shares’ structure during the 
observation period from 2000 to 2016: the shares of exports to Russia did not 
dominate in the early years but were only second to the UK’s shares for all three Baltic 
States in the beginning. This picture changed in the course of the 2000s. In Estonia 
and Lithuania the sharply rising Russian export shares passed by the British 
counterparts from 2003 onwards and reached then an unchallenged top position 
(Figures 1a and 3a). In Latvia, the same passing-by happened two years later (Figure 
2a). The Russian boom – only interrupted by a short contraction during the global 
financial crisis in 2009 – lasted until the outbreak of the Russian economic crisis in 
2012.  
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Figure 1a: Export Shares. Estonia's trade relations with Russia, the UK and the USA, 2000–
2016 
 
 
Figure 1b: Import Shares. Estonia's trade relations with Russia, the UK and the USA, 2000–
2016 
Source: Eurostat (2017); own compilation and calculations. 
 
Afterwards, Russian export shares decreased from 12 to 6 per cent in Estonia and from 
18 to less than 12 per cent in Latvia. In Lithuania, the share of exports to Russia still 
grew until 2014 to 21 per cent, and decreased sharply to less than 15 per cent in the 
aftermath.  
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Figure 2a: Export Shares. Latvia's trade relations with Russia, the UK and the USA, 2000–2016 
 
 
Figure 2b: Import Shares. Latvia's trade relations with Russia, the UK and the USA, 2000–
2016 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
In Estonia and in Lithuania, the Russian shares are still two to three times higher than 
the shares of exports to the UK and the USA. In Latvia, they are even two to eight 
times higher. Thus, the large neighbor Russia is still dominating the export statistics 
of the three Baltic States. 
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Figure 3a: Export Shares. Lithuania's trade relations with Russia, the UK and the USA, 2000–
2016 
 
Figure 3b: Import Shares. Lithuania's trade relations with Russia, the UK and the USA, 2000–
2016 
Source: See Figure 1. 
Nevertheless, the UK and the USA appear to be important destinations at least for 
Estonian and Lithuanian exports. For Estonia the USA have even played the greater 
role compared to the UK since 2005. For Lithuania the USA were more important in 
the beginning and again in the most recent years. In contrast, Latvia shows a clear 
preference for exports to the UK which had a clearly dominant position in the 
beginning of the observation period but export shares decreased sharply until 2008.  
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On the import side (Figures 1b, 2b, 3b) the picture is more homogeneous. The shares 
of imports from Russia clearly dominate throughout the observation period with some 
intermediate peaks and a more (for Estonia and Lithuania) or less (for Latvia) sharp 
decline after 2012 where the three Baltic States commenced to get rid of their 
dependency on Russian energy imports.5 The hierarchy of the import shares shows 
the UK shares on a stable second rank – with the exception of 2002 and 2003. 
It can be concluded from the shares’ analysis that the adjacently located large neighbor 
Russia has the greatest impact on Baltic exports and imports. But the UK and the USA 
reach non-negligible shares at least on the export side. These suggest that the UK and 
the USA are also important trading partners for the three Baltic States. Any troubles 
in these trade relations might harm them, too, the more as trade relations with these 
markets might provide still unexploited growth potential. 
3. Economic Dependencies on single Export and Import Markets 
The intensities of Baltic trade with Russia, the UK and the USA at first sight remind 
on the economic separation of Europe during the cold war and on the integration of 
the Baltic States into the Soviet division of labor. The Baltic trade relations with 
Russia are still much closer than those with the Western industrialized countries UK 
and USA. This is in contrast to the EU-28 countries which on average trade much 
more intensively with the UK and the USA than they do with Russia. This 
heterogeneous pattern can be possibly attributed to path dependencies, diverging 
distances and various economic factors — the gravity analysis in chapter 4 will shed 
light on these issues. An analysis of sectoral trade patterns will identify dependencies 
on single export and import markets in trade with Russia, the UK and the USA which 
might be hidden behind average export and import shares.6 
Estonia 
In the case of Estonia the share of exports to Russia amounted to 6.5 per cent in 2016 
— 5 percentage points above the EU average. For the majority of the main commodity 
groups the partner export weight was even significantly higher (Table 1a.). Exports in 
the top commodity group SITC-74 mainly comprises of pumps, heating and cooling 
equipment as well as mechanical handling equipment. In the groups ranked next, 
Estonia exports mainly special machinery and equipment of various kinds (SITC-72) 
and pigments, paints and varnishes (SITC-53). The export of beverages to Russia 
(SITC-11), just among the top five export groups, is near-complete export of alcoholic 
beverages. The Russian export weights in all these main commodity groups range 
between 26 and 37 per cent, thus constitute some dependencies from Russian markets. 
But with respect to Estonia’s world exports these commodities are of minor 
importance. The opposite is true for the export of electrical machinery (SITC-77), 
electrical apparatus and power machinery for a major part: The Russian export weight 
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is below average but this group has the same weight in Estonia’s world exports as the 
other main commodity groups altogether. 
The Estonian exports to the UK are not only significantly smaller than the exports to 
Russia but the main commodity groups are also somewhat different: Various wood 
products of a very low processing depth (SITC-24) and furniture (SITC-82) are 
dominating. Telecommunication equipment (SITC-76) and equipment for distributing 
electricity (SITC-77), major groups in Estonia’s world export, are ranked next. In 
contrast, prefabricated buildings (SITC-81) are less important for Estonia’s world 
export while they belong to the main exports commodities in Estonian UK trade. But 
for none of these major groups a critical degree of dependence from British markets 
can be observed, even though Estonian wood producers obviously developed trade 
relations above average. 
Table 1: 
Estonian trade with Russia, the UK and the USA  by the main commodity groups, 2016 
a. Exports    
SITC 2-digit Partner Export-Sharea World Export-Shareb Partner Export-
Weightc 
Russia    
74 12.8 3.2 26.0 
72 10.2 2.4 27.6 
53 8.2 1.4 37.0 
77 7.6 8.3 6.0 
11 7.3 1.3 35.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 6.5 
UK    
24 20.5 5.5 9.1 
82 11.6 4.1 6.9 
76 10.4 11.7 2.1 
77 8.0 8.3 2.3 
81 7.7 3.5 5.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 2.4 
USA    
33 26.8 5.3 13.4 
87 9.2 2.4 10.4 
77 9.1 8.3 2.9 
89 6.9 4.9 3.8 
76 5.1 11.7 1.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 2.7 
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Table 1 continued 
b. Imports    
SITC 2-digit Partner Import-Shared World Import-Sharee Partner Import-
Weightf 
Russia    
33 38.8 6.6 33.6 
24 13.6 1.9 40.7 
34 11.6 0.8 80.4 
67 6.2 2.9 12.2 
56 5.7 0.7 48.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 5.7 
UK    
72 12.6 3.2 9.7 
11 10.3 1.9 13.7 
77 9.3 9.7 2.4 
78 8.1 8.3 2.5 
89 6.3 4.9 3.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 2.5 
USA    
89 27.5 4.9 7.1 
9 20.2 1.2 20.6 
87 10.0 1.2 10.2 
76 4.7 7.1 0.8 
74 4.5 3.3 1.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 1.3 
aExports to the partner country by commodity group in per cent of total exports to the partner 
country. — bExports by commodity group in per cent of total exports to the world. — cExports 
to the partner country by commodity group in per cent of total exports by commodity group. 
— dImports from the partner country by commodity group in per cent of total imports from 
the partner country. — eImports by commodity group in per cent of total imports from the 
world. — fImports from the partner country by commodity group in per cent of total imports 
by commodity group. 
Source: Eurostat (2017); own calculations and composition. 
Estonia’s exports to the USA are clearly dominated by fuels of various kinds (SITC-
33). The USA are a major customer of these products but the weight of this group in 
the Estonian world exports is rather limited. The same is true for the export of 
technical instruments (SITC-87) which are ranked in second place. The US export 
weight in the other major groups is even smaller and close to the average share of 
Estonian US exports. While fuels are homogeneous products and relatively easy to 
sell on world markets, the substitution of markets for manufactured good like 
instruments might be more difficult — in any case Estonia’s dependency from US 
export markets is manageable. 
With respect to Estonian imports (Table 1.b.), the Russian share is more than twice as 
high as it is on EU average. Compared with the UK and the USA, the Russian import 
weights for single commodity groups are significantly higher, in case of natural gas 
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imports (SITC-34) it even accounts for more than 80 per cent. Russia is almost a 
monopolist for natural gas and the Russian supplies are difficult to substitute — at the 
same time Estonia’s natural gas imports have a share of less than 1 per cent of Estonian 
world imports. A similar discrepancy can be observed for the imports of two other 
major groups, simple wood products (SITC-24) and fertilizers (SITC-56) which are 
more easily to substitute. This is also true for the dominant imports of petroleum and 
products thereof (SITC-33) where potential import substitution prevents an Estonian 
dependency from Russian supplies. 
Estonian imports from the UK mainly comprise specialized machinery (SITC-72) and 
whisky (SITC-11) — the latter with the highest import weight in comparison with the 
other top import groups. Electrical machinery, motor cars and miscellaneous 
manufactured articles from the UK SITC-77, -78, -89) play a minor role in this 
ranking. Obviously the Estonian economy does not rely on UK imports to a large 
extent. 
A look at the US weights of the main import groups in trade with the USA shows that 
Estonia most of all rely on “not classified products” (SITC-9) which also account of 
one fifth of US imports. Nevertheless, on top of the import ranking are miscellaneous 
manufactured articles (SITC-89) which comprise of arms and ammunition by more 
than 90 per cent. Although more than one quarter of Estonian imports from the USA 
is military hardware, the relatively low partner weight reveals that the USA are not 
Estonia’s principal supplier.  
Latvia 
In the case of Latvia, the export relations with Russia are even closer compared with 
Estonia (Table 2a.): The Russian export weight is ten times higher than the EU 
average. Alcoholic beverages (SITC-11) and industrial machinery and equipment 
(SITC-74), with a focus on heating and cooling, are the dominant export groups. For 
these groups the Russian export weights (65 and 50 per cent) signal a strong 
orientation towards Russian markets. But their less impressive shares of Latvian world 
exports put their importance into perspective. The exports of medicaments (SITC-54), 
specialized machinery (SITC-72) and electrical apparatus and machinery (SITC-77) 
imply a minor role of Russian markets and these groups are less important for Latvia’s 
world export. However, the probability is high that individual enterprises heavily rely 
on Russian customers. 
This might be also true for Latvian exports to the UK although the UK export weight 
is just half of the Russian weight and below the EU average. The export is clearly 
focused on wood and simple products thereof (SITC-24) which account for about the 
half of all Latvian exports to the UK. Closely related appear the exports of wood 
manufactures (SITC-63) which contribute a further 14 per cent to the UK export. 
These groups together are a heavy weight of Latvia’s world export, with a share of 
more than 15 per cent. The double-digit UK export weights suggest intense sales 
relations. In contrast, exports of manufactures of base metal (SITC-69) and 
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telecommunication equipment (SITC-76) are of minor importance — the exports of 
crude animal and vegetable materials (SITC-29) is a mixture not further broken down. 
By contrast, Latvia’s exports to the USA are almost neglectable compared to the EU 
average and to the exports to Russia and the UK: The US export weight is only 1.4 
per cent. The focus is on telecommunication equipment (SITC-76) and alcoholic 
beverages (SITC-11). The export weights of these two groups are well above the total 
export weight but are smaller than those of the major export groups ranked next. 
Dependencies might exist at the firm level, at most. 
Table 2: 
Latvian trade with Russia, the UK and the USA  by the main commodity groups, 2016 
a. Exports    
SITC 2-digit Partner Export-Sharea World Export-Shareb Partner Export-
Weightc 
Russia    
11 25.4 4.5 64.6 
74 11.0 2.5 50.4 
54 5.8 3.7 17.9 
72 4.5 1.5 33.3 
77 3.9 3.1 14.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 11.4 
UK    
24 49.4 9.8 27.7 
63 13.9 5.8 13.1 
69 4.7 4.1 6.3 
29 3.8 1.7 12.2 
76 3.8 7.3 2.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 5.5 
USA    
76 19.9 7.3 3.9 
11 13.2 4.5 4.2 
72 8.1 1.5 7.6 
65 7.1 2.0 5.0 
87 6.3 1.2 7.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 1.4 
b. Imports    
SITC 2-digit Partner Import-Shared World Import-Sharee Partner Import-
Weightf 
Russia    
34 29.5 2.2 98.3 
67 19.7 3.3 44.0 
33 9.7 5.8 12.5 
56 7.7 1.0 57.9 
24 5.1 1.8 21.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 7.5 
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Table 2 continued 
b. Imports 
SITC 2-digit 
 
Partner Import-Shared World Import-Sharee 
Partner Import-
Weightf 
UK    
11 18.3 3.6 12.5 
89 7.8 5.0 3.9 
78 5.1 7.6 1.7 
59 4.6 2.8 4.0 
87 4.3 1.3 8.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 2.5 
USA    
76 22.5 6.2 2.9 
79 10.4 3.2 2.6 
87 8.4 1.3 5.3 
54 6.8 4.3 1.3 
77 6.1 4.3 1.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 0.8 
aExports to the partner country by commodity group in per cent of total exports to the partner 
country. — b Exports by commodity group in per cent of total exports to the world. — cExports 
to the partner country by commodity group in per cent of total exports by commodity group. — 
dImports from the partner country by commodity group in per cent of total imports from the 
partner country. — eImports by commodity group in per cent of total imports from the world. — 
fImports from the partner country by commodity group in per cent of total imports by commodity 
group. 
Source: See Table 1. 
With respect to imports (Table 2.b.), with 7.5 per cent Latvia’s share of imports from 
Russia is three times higher than the EU average. And imports of natural gas, ranked 
on top of the major import groups, even account for about 100 per cent of imports in 
this group (SITC-34). Obviously, Latvia is still dependent from Russian gas supplies 
— however, the import of natural gas covers only about 2 per cent of Latvia’s world 
imports. Flat-rolled products of iron (SITC-67) and fertilizers (SITC-56) are also 
primarily imported from Russia. Simple wood products (SITC-24) and petroleum 
(SITC-33) complement this import ranking, and exhibit lower double-digit import 
weights. What makes the difference from natural gas: all these imports could be easily 
substituted by alternative sources of supply on the world markets. 
Imports from the UK are less important for Latvia but at least the group of alcoholic 
beverages (SITC-11), the top import group, exhibits a double-digit import weight. The 
import weight of the second ranked import group, miscellaneous manufactured 
articles (SITC-89), is already much smaller — “arms and ammunition” is the biggest 
subgroup. Furthermore, no prominent dependencies can be detected for the other 
major import groups: motor cars (SITC-78), insecticides (SITC-59) and various 
instruments (SITC-87). 
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Compared with Russia and the UK, Latvian imports from the USA have the lowest 
weight with a share of less than 1 per cent of total Latvian imports. 
Telecommunications equipment (SITC-76) and aircrafts (SITC-79) are ranked on top 
with import weights below 3 per cent. Imports of various instruments (SITC-87), 
medicinal and pharmaceutical products (SITC-54) and “various electrical machinery” 
(SITC-77) also do not constitute any eye-catching dependency.  
Lithuania 
Lithuania’s exports to Russia are outstanding in comparison with the exports of the 
other Baltic States to Russia: an export share of 13.5 percent indicates rather close 
trade relations (Table 3a.). The Russian export weight in the main export groups even 
ranges from 17 to 61 per cent. The two top commodity groups come close to 50 per 
cent: General industrial machinery and equipment (SITC-74), with a focus on heating 
and cooling equipment, and specialized industrial machinery (SITC-72) are highly 
dependent from Russian markets. This applies as much more to alcoholic beverages 
(SITC-11) which heavenly rely on the Russian market. Electrical machinery exports 
(SITC-77) depend less on Russia although in the past it was an important customer of 
equipment for distributing electricity. Meanwhile, plastic articles, toys, baby carriages 
and sporting goods (SITC-89) reveal a higher level of export market diversity. A 
common feature of these major commodity groups is that none of them dominates 
Lithuanian world exports — all together they only account for about 15 per cent of 
Lithuania’s world exports. 
By contrast, the UK is a minor export partner of Lithuania. But at least the top export 
group exhibits a double-digit UK export weight: Furniture (SITC-82) plays the most 
prominent role in Lithuania’s export to the UK. Exports of petroleum (SITC-33), 
fertilizers (SITC-56) and plastics in primary form (SITC-57) give the impression that 
the technology intensity of exports to the UK is much lower than of exports to Russia. 
The export of various kinds of apparel complements this picture (SITC-82). 
A similar structure can be observed for Lithuania’s US exports. Petroleum (SITC-33) 
dominates the export relations with a high US weight of 25 per cent. The US market 
is also of major importance for chemical products (SITC-59) whereas the US weight 
of the other major export groups — furniture (SITC-82), fertilizers (SITC-56) and 
instruments (SITC-87) — is close to the average US export share of 5.2 percent which 
is by far the highest in comparison of the Baltic States.  
On the imports side, the high intensity of Lithuania’s trade with Russia is mirrored by 
an import share of 14.4 per cent (Table 3b.). But imports from Russia are ruled by 
petroleum (SITC-33) with a share of more than 70 per cent of Lithuanian total imports 
from Russia and a share of more than 70 per cent of Lithuania’s total petroleum 
imports. The other raw material-intensive imports of natural gas, fertilizers, iron and 
steel products and electric current are only of little weight although the Russian import 
weight in these groups is partly far beyond the average. Of course, petroleum imports 
could be easily substituted by alternative sources of supply. However, this might be 
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difficult if petroleum is processed in Lithuanian refineries for export. In this case it 
possibly would not pay off to purchase petroleum from far away suppliers. 
Table 3: 
Lithuanian trade with Russia, the UK and the USA  by the main commodity groups, 2016 
a. Exports    
SITC 2-digit Partner Export-Sharea World Export-Shareb Partner Export-
Weightc 
Russia    
74 13.7 3.9 47.5 
72 6.9 2.1 45.5 
77 5.9 3.8 20.9 
11 5.4 1.2 60.8 
89 5.1 4.1 16.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 13.5 
UK    
82 15.6 6.5 10.2 
33 9.4 13.1 3.0 
84 6.0 2.8 9.0 
56 5.2 3.0 7.2 
57 4.5 2.5 7.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 4.3 
USA    
33 63.8 13.1 25.0 
59 7.0 2.5 14.4 
82 6.4 6.5 5.1 
56 3.0 3.0 5.2 
87 2.8 2.0 7.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 5.2 
b. Imports    
SITC 2-digit Partner Import-Shared World Import-Sharee Partner Import-
Weightf 
Russia    
33 70.4 14.3 71.2 
34 4.9 1.7 41.5 
27 3.5 1.0 53.5 
67 3.0 2.3 18.5 
35 2.9 1.4 29.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 14.4 
UK    
74 7.0 4.1 4.6 
77 6.5 4.0 4.4 
55 6.4 1.6 10.9 
65 6.1 2.4 6.9 
71 6.0 0.8 20.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 2.7 
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Table 3 continued 
b. Imports    
SITC 2-digit Partner Import-Shared World Import-Sharee Partner Import-
Weightf 
USA    
78 19.3 7.5 3.3 
71 10.6 0.8 17.4 
72 9.6 3.4 3.6 
76 8.9 3.3 3.4 
03 6.1 1.9 4.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 1.3 
aExports to the partner country by commodity group in per cent of total exports to the partner 
country. — bExports by commodity group in per cent of total exports to the world. — cExports 
to the partner country by commodity group in per cent of total exports by commodity group. — 
dImports from the partner country by commodity group in per cent of total imports from the 
partner country. — eImports by commodity group in per cent of total imports from the world. — 
fImports from the partner country by commodity group in per cent of total imports by commodity 
group. 
Source: See Table 1. 
Lithuanian imports from the UK are only a fraction of imports from Russia. Dominant 
import groups are missing, while technology-intensive goods in the form of general 
industrial, electrical and power-generating machinery (SITC-74, -77, -71) are 
characteristic for these imports. Piston engines seem to be of special importance in 
this context. Perfumery and related products (SITC-55), with a high UK import 
weight, and textile yarn and fabrics (SITC-65) complete the top 5 import groups which 
do not reveal any crucial dependencies. 
Even less important for Lithuania are imports from the USA with a share of 1.3 per 
cent of total Lithuanian imports. Motor cars account for about one fifth of US imports 
(SITC-78), followed by engines and motors (SITC-71). The latter group is the only 
one with a double-digit US import weight. Agricultural machinery and tractors (SITC-
72) and telecommunications equipment (SITC-76) are the other major import groups 
which all exhibit a relatively high technology-intensity — the similarities with the UK 
import structures are obvious. The only exception is the import of fish of various kinds 
(SITC-03).  
Conclusions 
The analysis of the Baltic States’ sectoral patterns of trade with Russia, the UK and 
the USA gives a rather mixed picture of dependencies on single markets. In general, 
Russia is the major supplier of various raw materials, especially petroleum and natural 
gas. While most of these supplies could be easily substituted by alternative supplies 
from the world markets, Russia’s position as the monopolist on the Baltic gas markets 
will be more persistent because import substitution is more costly and only possible 
on a long-term basis. UK and the US enterprises do not have a position of comparable 
16 
 
strength on single Baltic markets, not even for defense goods which might gain 
importance in the course of the new NATO politics towards Russia. 
With respect to Baltic exports, it appears to be crucial to increase the competitiveness 
of industrial products to develop the markets of high income countries for income-
elastic goods. It is obvious that Baltic exports to Russia are relatively technology-
intensive while exports to UK and US markets are much more raw material- and labor-
intensive. Poor product qualities and investment strategies with a focus on Russian 
markets might explain this dichotomy of Baltic exports. 
4. Baltic Trade viewed from a Gravity Perspective 
Russia appears as the main trading partner of the Baltic States. The UK and the USA 
are less important partners, but their export and imports shares as well as the pertinent 
commodity structure of trade suggest that these markets should not be neglected. In 
order to systematically analyze trade relations with the three partners a gravity model 
is deployed.  
4.1. Some Methodological Remarks 
Gravity models are often used in trade and integration analyses to assess the shaping 
forces of international trade flows. They assume that gravitational forces to undertake 
economic interaction stem from high incomes or population figures of trading 
partners, because these features promise high revenues from business deals with 
numerous well-funded clients. But transaction costs which may vary with distance 
can be expected to impede the impact of the gravitational forces on the intensity of 
trade relations. Various forms of distance may be relevant, not only real geographical 
distances as a proxy of transportation costs, but also „virtual distances“ as exerted by 
tariff- or non-tariff-trade barriers, different languages, diversities in business cultures, 
traditions or economic systems. Gravity models date back to Linder (1961), Tinbergen 
(1962) and Linnemann (1966), but have been further developed over time and 
remained a common tool not only for trade but also for transport analyses.  
In this contribution a double-log specification is deployed and performed by pooled 
OLS regression for the period 2000 to 2015. Dependent variable are logs of trade 
flows tijT , either exports tijX  or imports tijM , of each of the reporting countries: 
 
k
kkijtjtjtij
DUMDISTPCIGDPConstT  lnlnlnln
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with subscript t indicating the year of observation (2000 to 2015), i the reporting 
country, j the respective bilateral trading partner, k the enumerative index of country 
dummies, and ε is representing the error term.  
The reporting countries i in our model are all 28 (still) member states of the EU-28, 
the trading partners j are 194 countries worldwide for which data for the independent 
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variables GDP, the per-capita-income PCI and bilateral distance DIST as main 
shaping forces could be collected. The group of dummy variables k (= 1, if the 
inherent condition is met, and =0 otherwise) consists of the variable CONTIG (=1, if 
i and j share a common land border), various EU entities (EU15 without UK and 
DE/Germany, UK and DE for the latter two countries,7 the new EU-members of 2004, 
the new EU-members of 2007 and 2013), and RUS for Russia and CIS–RUS for the 
rest of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) eventually trading via Russian 
links. The data – in sum 86,912 observations – have been obtained from Eurostat 
(2016) for trade data, World Bank (2016) for GDP and PCI data, Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2016) for exchange rates to translate the Eurostat trade figures to US-$, 
and Mayer and Zignago (2011) for distances and information on common borders. 
After calculating this model separately for exports and imports, the numerical 
variables GDP, PCI, and DIST represent the average attracting forces of market size 
GDP and individual wealth PCI as well as the average hampering force of distance, 
while the coefficients of the country dummies represent the specific attitude to the 
partner markets j for the whole observation period. In a second step, predicted export 
and import values are calculated from these “average” equations and subtracted from 
the real values. The positive or negative differences (residuals) for the individual 
reporting countries i and the highlighted trading partners j indicate, whether reporting 
country i is trading with partner j more intensely in the respective year or less than the 
average in the sample. Thus, particular affinities are displayed, and we can see how 
far the countries observed were connected with Russia, the UK and the USA from 
2000-2015. 
4.2. Gravity Estimates for the EU-28 as Benchmark 
Table 4 shows the results of the export gravity equation. The first five numerical 
variables define the average attracting forces of market size and wealth on export 
flows and the impeding influence of distance between exporter and destination: GDPs 
both of reporting and partner countries play the dominant role, a high coefficient 
above/close to 1 which is highly significant at the 1 per cent level indicates that large 
markets dominate trade flows. The per-capita-incomes are not equally relevant: that 
of the reporter is small but significant, and that of the partner is even totally 
insignificant. Apparently, the EU-28 members are exporting on average also to less 
wealthy countries. At the same time, the highly significant distance coefficient of 
nearly 1.2 indicates that distance is in fact hampering trade flows of European 
countries to a non-negligible extent. The CONTIG dummy indicating the trade-
enhancing influence of a common land border exhibits a non-negligible and highly 
significant value. It should indeed be high in this context because the EU-28 members 
are trading intensively with each other via a great variety of common land borders. 
For European exporters as a whole the value of the UK dummy, still significant at the 
5 per cent level, is higher than the smaller RUS value which is even fully insignificant. 
                                                          
7 The UK has been singled out as one of our objects of observation, and Germany, because 
German exports and imports might dominate the subsample of BSR-EU-members. 
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This means in the context of the model that European countries are exporting 
definitely a little bit more intensely to the UK than British GDP and PCI as well as 
the distance between the UK and the exporter would suggest. 
Table 4:  
Export Gravity Estimates for the EU-28 Countries 2000–2015  
Dependent variable: 
lnXda 
Coefficient β Standard Error t-Value Probability>t 
lnGDPi (Reporter) 1.1649 .0046 252.62 0.000 
lnPCIi (Reporter) .0318 .0099 3.21 0.001 
lnGDPj (Partner) .9320 .0039 239.64 0.000 
lnPCIj (Partner) .0051 .0054 .94 0.349 
lnDISTij  –1.1823 .0099 –119.08 0.000 
CONTIG .6483 .0349 18.60 0.000 
EU15–UKDE .1835 .0224 8.18 0.000 
UK .1196 .0483 2.47 0.013 
DE .2798 .0576 4.86 0.000 
EUNew2004 .6650 .0234 28.44 0.000 
EUNew200713 .3570 .0309 11.54 0.000 
RUS .0725 .0514 1.41 0.158 
CIS–RUS .2168 .0272 7.96 0.000 
USA .1584 .0468 3.39 0.001 
_cons –26.8451 .1635 –164.17 0.000 
Number of obs = 73626; F (14, 73611) = 18146.68; Prob.>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.7860; 
Root MSE = 1.6918. 
aExports of reporter i to partner j in US-$. 
Source: Eurostat (2016); World Bank (2016); Deutsche Bundesbank (2016); Mayer and Zignago 
(2011); own compilation and calculations. 
In contrast, the coefficient of the RUS dummy seems to be zero, and European trade 
relations with Russia are thus on a level which can be expected from Russia’s market 
size and distance from Europe. Hence, the UK seems to be more important as an 
export destination for Europe as the Russian market. However, one should not forget 
the positive and significant coefficient for the rest of the CIS. This might raise again 
the relevance of the Russian case a bit, because influences can be expected to exist, 
but given the economic dominance of Russia over the rest of the CIS the impact of 
Russia itself should be greater.  
The USA dummy has a slightly higher value than the UK dummy, and it is highly 
significant even at the 1 per cent level. Hence, the USA is the even more important 
export destination for the EU-28 countries compared to the UK. This is remarkable 
insofar as the greater economic weight of the USA is already controlled for by the 
numerical “country j”-Variables, whereby the distance to the USA is several times 
longer than the distance to the UK. In sum, the data suggest that the Brexit might do 
more harm to European exports than the Russian crisis so far, but any substantiated 
protectionist policy of the USA would harm Europe’s exports substantially more. 
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The same procedure – again for the EU-28 trade flows as a whole – is applied to 
imports. Results are displayed in Table 5. All independent and dummy variables used 
here are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level here. The numerical variables 
behave as expected. It is remarkable that the distance coefficient is much smaller for 
imports than it is for exports, i.e., the hampering impact of distance is less important 
for imports to Europe than for its exports. 
Table 5:  
Import Gravity Estimates for the EU-28 Countries 2000–2015  
Dependent variable: 
lnMda 
Coefficient Standard Error t-Value Probability>t 
lnGDPi (Reporter) 1.3364 .0069 194.06 0.000 
lnPCIi (Reporter) –.6129 .0159 –38.66 0.000 
lnGDPj (Partner) 1.2409 .0054 230.61 0.000 
lnPCIj (Partner) –.0718 .0083 –8.68 0.000 
lnDISTij  –.7505 .0145 –51.81 0.000 
CONTIG 1.1126 .0445 25.00 0.000 
EU15–UKDE 1.4643 .0316 46.39 0.000 
UK .4348 .0581 7.48 0.000 
DE 1.0704 .0580 18.44 0.000 
EUNew2004 2.1513 .0316 68.18 0.000 
EUNew200713 1.4991 .0419 35.81 0.000 
RUS 1.1817 .0653 18.10 0.000 
CIS–RUS .5240 .0449 11.68 0.000 
USA –.8204 .0559 –14.69 0.000 
_cons –36.4341 .2264 160.96 0.000 
Number of obs = 69949; F (14, 69934) = 14686.65; Prob.>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.6869; 
Root MSE = 2.5201. 
(a) Imports of reporter i from partner j in US-$. 
Source: Eurostat (2016); World Bank (2016); Deutsche Bundesbank (2016); Mayer and Zignago 
(2011); own compilation and calculations. 
All dummy variables – CONTIG and the various country (group) dummies – show 
positive coefficients. Some are even of remarkable size, and all are statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. The EU-28 countries are importing more from the 
selected partners than it would be suggested by both trading partners’ market size and 
the mutual distance between them. However, the comparison of the values of the 
Russian, the UK and the USA dummies is most interesting. For European imports, 
trade flows from Russia appear to be definitely more important than those from the 
UK – the RUS coefficient has a size more than twice as high as the UK one. The 
reason is the impact of energy sources, particularly natural gas and petroleum, as 
already analyzed in section 3. In fact striking is the negative coefficient of the USA 
dummy, with a size not far from “1” and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
For Europe as a whole, the USA is definitely a less important import source: trade 
flows from across the Atlantic are by far smaller than could be expected in view of 
the economic weight of the USA. 
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4.3. How Russia, the UK and the USA are shaping Trade Flows of the Baltic 
States and their BSR Neighbors 
The results of the gravity estimates for the EU-28 trade can be used for identifying the 
determinants of the Baltic States’ and other BSR countries’ trade. For this purpose, a 
comparison of the real trade figures with the calculated figures from the equation 
results in Tables 4 and 5 is performed in the following section 4.3.1. In a second step, 
a slightly adjusted gravity model will be calculated for the BSR countries as a group, 
and separately for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in section 4.3.2. 
4.3.1. Baltic Trade Flows Compared with the European Average 
If we take the results of the coefficient estimates displayed in Tables 4 and 5 as the 
baseline of trading links of European countries, we can calculate their hypothetical 
exports and imports, assuming that the average values in the coefficients would be 
valid for all individual observations of trade flows. If we subtract logs of these 
hypothetical exports / imports from the logs of the real ones, these “residuals” show 
in how far the pertinent trade flow follows the European average or is more or less 
affected. If they are positive then reporting country i exports / imports more to / from 
partner country j than the average, and vice versa for negative residuals. Thus 
countries with positive residuals, particularly over a longer time-span, would be more 
affected of disturbances in the pertinent trade link than others with smaller or even 
negative residuals, and differences in size indicate higher or lower affectedness.  
Table 6 displays the results of this calculation. It shows the residuals of the three Baltic 
States as well as of the other BSR countries regarding trade links to Russia, to the UK 
and to the USA. As space is limited, only four years have been chosen: 2000, 2006, 
2012 (before difficulties in Russia began), and 2015 as the current edge in the gravity 
data set.  
Some of the results are predictable, some others are striking. Beginning with the three 
Baltic States, the results indicate that these do not behave as a group. One common 
feature on the export side, however, is the dominance of the UK export-residual in 
2000. In that year the three Baltic States were exporting more than proportionally to 
the UK; the same was true for exports to Russia, but to a lesser extent, as the lower 
RUS residual indicates. For Estonia it changed from 2006 on, Russia became more 
important. Only in the most recent year both residuals converged again so that the 
dependence on the Russian market began to decline. Latvia was leaning on the UK 
still in 2006, but in 2012 and 2015 Russia was dominating as export destination, 
although in 2015 the difference in residuals declined here, too. In contrast, Lithuania 
exhibits higher RUS values with the exception of 2012. Hence, its position as 
strongest exporter to Russia in the EU-28 is corroborated by these data. But 
nevertheless, the UK export residuals have been positive during the whole observation 
period for all three Baltic States. 
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Table 6:  
Residuals of Trade of EU-Member States in the BSR Exports with Russia, the UK and the 
USA 2000, 2006, 2012, and 2015a  
Reporter Baltic States Nordic Countries Large BSR 
countries 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Denmark Finland Sweden Germany Poland 
Residual Exports to 
Russia 2000 1,3040 ,9426 1,4554 ,5856 ,9879 –,0993 ,5562 n.ab 
UK 2000 1,7206 2,1286 1,6432 ,6366 1,5297 1,0602 –,8195 n.ab 
USA 2000 ,2540 ,4052 ,9274 ,4925 1,0228 1,0014 ,5207 n.ab 
Russia 2006 1,0619 ,7642 1,1458 –,1466 ,4524 –,4500 ,3382 –,2721 
UK 2006 ,4913 ,8903 ,7395 –,0222 ,5928 ,2975 –1,2435 ,0208 
USA 2006 1,3890 –,5198 ,7240 ,1964 ,4769 ,6581 ,2428 –,8807 
Russia 2012 ,9893 ,9504 1,2000 –,7680 –,4871 –1,0779 –,0089 –,6322 
UK 2012 ,4982 ,3645 1,4295 ,0208 ,0929 ,2030 –1,2772 ,2815 
USA 2012 1,0529 –,8348 –,1539 ,1023 ,0383 –,0284 ,0440 –,9273 
Russia 2015 ,5492 ,7953 1,1499 –1,1710 –,7421 –1,3045 –,2906 –,7567 
UK 2015 ,4151 ,6548 ,8340 –,5417 –,1436 –,1367 –1,3382 ,2494 
USA 2015 ,3214 –,7438 ,7122 ,2019 –,0709 –,0747 ,1142 –,7693 
 
Imports from 
Russia 2000 1,9271 1,3761 2,1596 ,3101 1,1060 ,3306 ,5841 n.ab 
UK 2000 1,0383 ,2951 ,8441 1,0014 1,1215 1,1851 –,7683 n.ab 
USA 2000 ,8683 –,0635 ,1521 ,6072 ,7191 ,9697 ,0498 n.ab 
Russia 2006 1,1752 ,0865 1,1356 –,6728 ,2478 ,1068 –,2820 –,9014 
UK 2006 ,7021 ,0349 ,3515 ,2475 ,5398 ,4779 –1,2646 –1,0460 
USA 2006 ,2613 –,5346 ,0262 ,1004 ,0140 ,1101 –,4536 –1,5768 
Russia 2012 –,1028 –,4123 ,8633 –1,8188 –,3879 –,3108 –,8674 –1,1760 
UK 2012 1,4132 ,3974 ,4876 ,1771 ,1019 ,5286 –1,2987 –1,0110 
USA 2012 –,2041 –,7922 –,3491 –,2463 –,3354 –,1098 –,6019 –1,2966 
Russia 2015 –,0430 –,1684 ,6456 –,7345 –,5715 –,4711 –,9097 –1,3378 
UK 2015 ,6914 ,1489 ,5080 –,2505 –,2298 ,0436 –1,6739 –1,0590 
USA 2015 –,0255 –1,0895 –,1895 –,3977 –,5645 –,5534 –,6991 –1,3579 
aLogs of real Exports to / Imports from Russia / United Kingdom / United States minus logs of calculated 
exports/imports from the equations in Tables 4 and 5. — bApparently, Poland did not yet report to Eurostat 
in 2000, and has not provided retrospective data after its accession in 2004 as other new members as Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania have done. The Polish data of the respective years are missing in the Eurostat (2016) 
database. 
Source: Eurostat (2016); World Bank (2016); Deutsche Bundesbank (2016); Mayer and Zignago 
(2011); own compilation and calculations. 
As regards the USA, this country has been an important destination for exports from 
Estonia and Lithuania with partially rather large positive residuals (with the exception 
of the year 2012 for Lithuania). For Latvia this was only the case at the beginning of 
the observation period in the year 2000. Later on, US export residuals for Latvia 
turned to the negative side with a non-negligible size. 
On the import side, Estonia and Latvia apparently managed to curb their dependence 
on Russian imports which was still visible in 2000 and 2006. The more recent values 
of 2012 and 2015 indicate more than proportional imports from the UK, while imports 
from Russia were less than proportional, given the individual countries’ market size 
and location. Lithuania again behaved differently: Russian imports dominated the 
time series.  
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The UK import residuals have been positive as well during the whole observation 
period for all three Baltic States. This means that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have 
something to lose if a “hard Brexit” would occur. In contrast, the USA import 
residuals for Estonia and Lithuania showed positive values only for the years 2000 
and 2006. Afterwards, they turned to the negative side, as it was the case for Latvia 
for the whole observation period: Baltic imports from the USA failed to reach the EU 
level, with the exception of Estonia, where the negative residual was close to zero in 
2015. Latvia again appears as the Baltic State with the least intensive trade relations 
to the USA. 
Turning to the other BSR countries as benchmarks: For the Nordic countries it is 
plausible that both Denmark and Sweden exhibit higher positive UK-residuals (or 
lower negative ones) than Russian residuals for exports as well as for imports in all 
years. Any “hard Brexit” would touch them clearly much more than the Russian crisis 
has done so far. The same seems to be true for Finland, although the actual export and 
import shares are higher for Russia.8 But only the import residuals of 2000 in Table 6 
seem to be more or less identical, and in all other cases the UK one is higher or less 
negative. Finland’s location helps to explain this result, i.e. the proximity to Russia 
and the medium term distance to the UK. Controlling for Finland’s neighborhood to 
Russia, a “hard Brexit” wood hurt the country, too, as it is the case for its Western 
Scandinavian neighbors.  
Regarding the USA, the export residuals of Nordic countries were positive and high 
in 2000, later on they decreased. For Denmark, the residual again increased in 2015, 
while the USA residuals turned slightly negative in Sweden from 2012 on and in 
Finland for 2015. For Denmark the USA have kept their position as an important 
export destination, while for Finland and Sweden exports to the USA are at the level 
that can be expected in view of America’s economic weight and distance from the 
Nordic countries, as the values are close to zero. The USA import residuals equally 
decreased from rather high values in 2000, but here the development follows a steeper 
slope. 
Poland clearly shows a much higher dependency on exports to the UK, because all 
UK export residuals are clearly positive while Russian ones are all negative. 
Regarding the USA, Poland is much less oriented towards exports to the USA than 
any other country in the whole sample. The size of negative Polish US export residuals 
is even higher than that of the Latvian residuals, and the residuals do not shrink 
substantially in the course of time. On the import side this analysis also shows at least 
a slight dominance of imports from the UK. UK import residuals are negative, but are 
closer to zero than the Russian ones, with the exception of 2006. Polish US import 
residuals turn out to be the highest, both among the three sources of imports analyzed 
here, and among all reporting countries in our sample. Thus Poland might be more 
anxious of the Brexit compared to protectionist tendencies in the USA. But given the 
                                                          
8 Calculated form the sources of Figures 1-3. 
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close connection of Poland to German markets it might suffer indirectly, if Germany 
would be hit by US protectionism.  
Germany itself turns out to be a special case in this context. Although the share of 
exports to and imports from Russia is definitely much lower than UK shares, the 
gravity analysis shows that Russian residuals are either positive or at least less 
negative than the UK residuals for both exports and imports. In the first years of the 
observation period Germany was trading with Russia more than proportionally (as 
market size and location would suggest). This changed in the years after 2006 with 
increasing intensity. But German trade links to the UK were less than proportional 
during the whole period.  
The German results concerning the USA are different from the UK outcomes. The US 
export residuals of Germany are positive during the whole observation period, albeit 
shrinking in size. The USA have kept so far their position as important export 
destination for German commodities. On the import side the initially positive US 
residuals turned to the negative side, reaching a non-negligible size. But in any case 
they did not reach the relatively high UK level. 
In sum the gravity residual analysis shows that the Baltic States and their Baltic Rim 
neighbors have to lose from all three threats to free trade. The Russian crisis is still 
more relevant for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but Brexit and US protectionism 
might hurt them as well. For the other BSR countries the British and American case 
might be more threatening, at least on the export side. 
4.3.2. A Gravity Analysis Focusing on the Baltic States and their Neighbors 
In addition to the analysis performed so far – by calculating the gravity model for the 
entire EU-28 and assessing the residuals for Baltic Rim countries – a second method 
has been applied, i.e. calculating a gravity model (a) for the whole group of Baltic 
Rim reporting countries i among the EU-28 members as a benchmark, and (b) for the 
three Baltic States Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania separately.  
The set of independent variables has been changed insofar, as country dummies have 
been redesigned in order (i) to discern between different Baltic Rim country groups 
as partner countries j and, at the same time, (ii) to construct the country dummies in a 
“profile-free” manner without any overlapping. Therefore, the CONTIG variable has 
been skipped, as all major contiguity relations in the BSR are now controlled by 
explicit country group dummies: Nordic countries (NORDIC) has been subtracted 
from the EU-15 alongside with the UK and Germany. Accordingly, Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania (BALT3) as well as Poland (PL) have been subtracted from the new 
EU-members of 2004. For both groups (a) and (b) of reporting countries i the 
coefficients directly convey information on the attitude towards the partner countries 
j as given by the country dummy groups. Moreover, for the individual country 
gravities of the three Baltic States the numerical variable lnPCIi (Reporter) has been 
skipped, because it interacts with lnGDPi (Reporter) if a single-country-gravity is 
calculated. In the actual model design lnGDPi (Reporter) represents a kind of time 
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trend variable for exports or imports. The tables 6a to 6d are displaying the results of 
this focused gravity analysis for exports.  
BSR Exports 
With respect to the numerical variables of the equation for the whole EU member 
states in the BSR (Table 6a), both GDPi and GDPj variables show the expected 
behavior with high positive and highly significant coefficients. Coefficients of both 
PCIi of the reporter and PCIj of the partners are small but positive and significant as 
well, whereby that of the partners is much smaller. Baltic Rim countries are trading 
more with richer countries than the rest of the EU-28, as the PCIj coefficient in Table 
6a is greater than the (non-significant) coefficient for the former overall gravity (Table 
4). In this context it is revealing that the coefficient of the distance variable DISTij, 
(which is negative and highly significant as normal and) is smaller for the Baltic Rim 
countries (–1 versus –1.18). The trade hampering impact of distance does not play the 
same role for the exports of the Baltic Rim countries than for the EU countries as a 
joint sample. 
Concerning the country group dummies of the BSR export equation it can be noted 
that all of them are positive and highly significant at the 1 per-cent-level for the Baltic 
Rim countries (Table 6a). With all of them the BSR countries are trading more 
intensely than might be expected from the partners’ economic weight and location. 
Among the EU-15 core countries, the Nordic countries exhibit the highest coefficient 
of 1.3 followed by the coefficients for Germany, the UK and the rest of the EU-15. 
Only the latter one is somewhat lagging behind in size. Among the new members, the 
intra-Baltic States form an integration zone on its own with an outstanding coefficient 
of 2.2, but also the coefficients for Poland and the other new members of 2004 have 
a non-negligible size. The new members of 2007 and 2013 appear to be less important 
as export destinations. 
Comparing the coefficients of the most interesting core variables, the UK, RUS and 
USA, renders a somewhat surprising result: Russia’s coefficient now has a positive 
value beyond “1” for the entire group of Baltic Rim countries, which is higher than 
that of the UK with .73 and that of the USA with .34 (Table 6a). This result can partly 
be explained by the fact that we have skipped the CONTIG variable in this equation, 
because all common land border effects are caught by the country dummies. 
Therefore, the Russia dummy now captures part of the explaining power of the 
common land borders for export flows from Finland, the Baltic States and from 
Poland. Nevertheless, the high RUS coefficient tells us in the context of the model 
that exports to Russia from the BSR are high in relationship to the only moderate 
economic weight of Russia and its distinctly adjacent location to the BSR. Moreover, 
we know from the residuals in section 4.3 that the result of the joint BSR equation 
renders a “mélange” of the Nordic links to the UK and the USA, the Baltic States’ 
links to Russia, and Germany’s more than proportional exports to Russia.  
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Table 6a:  
Export Gravity Estimates for the Baltic Rim EU Members 2000–2015a  
Dependent variable: 
lnXda 
Coefficient β Standard Error t-Value Probability>t 
lnGDPi (Reporter) 1.0933 .0085 127.99 0.000 
lnPCIi (Reporter) .2481 .0204 12.16 0.000 
lnGDPj (Partner) .9110 .0073 123.95 0.000 
lnPCIj (Partner) .0272 .0103 2.65 0.008 
lnDISTij  –.9968 .0199 –50.12 0.000 
EU15–UKDENORDIC .4698 .0427 11.00 0.000 
UK .7264 .0821 8.84 0.000 
DE 1.0070 .0744 13.53 0.000 
NORDIC 1.2859 .0627 20.49 0.000 
EUNew2004–BALTPL .9590 .0485 19.77 0.000 
BALT3 2.1984 .1012 21.72 0.000 
PL 1.0193 .1030 10.46 0.000 
EUNew200713 .3422 .0499 11.48 0.000 
RUS 1.0768 .1030 10.46 0.000 
CIS–RUS 1.0027 .0480 20.88 0.000 
USA .3441 .0640 5.38 0.000 
_cons –28.4155 .3092 –91.89 0.000 
Number of obs = 20693; F (16, 20676) = 5643.73; Prob.>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.8078; 
Root MSE = 1.6132. 
aExports of reporter i to partner j in US-$. 
Source: Eurostat (2016); World Bank (2016); Deutsche Bundesbank (2016); Mayer and Zignago 
(2011); own compilation and calculations. 
One may notice, in addition, that the export link to the rest of the CIS-States excluding 
Russia (variable “CIS–RUS”) exhibits a rather positive record with a highly 
significant coefficient of “1” in Table 6a. In the context of the model this result 
indicates more than proportional exports to these countries despite their rather limited 
economic potential and their remote geographical location. Moreover, this positive 
coefficient may give a hint that trade with the other CIS states may in fact take place 
via Baltic Sea routes. 
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Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Exports 
Turning to the individual export equations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Tables 
6b to 6d) we can notice that the coefficient of the reporter-GDPi is much smaller for 
Estonia than for Latvia and Lithuania. In the context of the double-log specification 
used here this means that a one percent increase of the reporter- GDPi resulted in a 
smaller increase of only .6 per cent of Estonian exports while Latvian and Lithuanian 
exports grew more or less proportionally with the domestic GDP during the 
observation period. At the same time, the negative distance coefficient DISTij is higher 
for Estonia compared to Latvia and Lithuania. Apparently, Estonia’s export partners 
are primarily located less far away than those of Latvia and Lithuania.  
Table 6b:  
Export Gravity Estimates for Estonia 2000–2015a  
Dependent variable: 
lnXda 
Coefficient β Standard Error t-Value Probability>t 
lnGDPi (Reporter) .5931 .0841 7.05 0.000 
lnGDPj (Partner) .8626 .0251 34.38 0.000 
lnPCIj (Partner) .0900 .0380 2.37 0.018 
lnDISTij  –1.1251 .0657 –17.14 0.000 
EU15–UKDENORDIC .6514 .1291 5.05 0.000 
UK 1.1183 .1403 7.97 0.000 
DE 1.3677 .1503 9.10 0.000 
NORDIC 2.0400 .2024 10.08 0.000 
EUNew2004–BALTPL 1.3652 .1466 9.31 0.000 
BALT3 4.2287 .1926 21.96 0.000 
PL 1.1994 .1580 7.59 0.000 
EUNew200713 .2239 .1625 1.38 0.168 
RUS 2.0647 .1609 12.83 0.000 
CIS–RUS 1.6950 .1361 12.45 0.000 
USA 1.1654 .1876 6.21 0.000 
_cons –12.7556 2.0573 –6.20 0.000 
Number of obs = 2281; F (15, 2265) = 1483.48; Prob.>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.7228; Root 
MSE = 1.7753. 
aExports of Estonia to partner j in US-$. 
Source: Eurostat (2016); World Bank (2016); Deutsche Bundesbank (2016); Mayer and Zignago 
(2011); own compilation and calculations. 
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Table 6c: 
Export Gravity Estimates for Latvia 2000–2015a  
Dependent variable: 
lnXda 
Coefficient β Standard Error t-Value Probability>t 
lnGDPi (Reporter) 1.0731 .0891 12.04 0.000 
lnGDPj (Partner) .7336 .0258 28.39 0.000 
lnPCIj (Partner) .1225 .0388 3.15 0.002 
lnDISTij  –1.0170 .0117 –14.15 0.000 
EU15–UKDENORDIC .9710 .1425 6.81 0.000 
UK 2.2761 .2145 10.61 0.000 
DE 2.2020 .1807 12.18 0.000 
NORDIC 2.0200 .2030 9.95 0.000 
EUNew2004–BALTPL 1.7455 .1649 10.59 0.000 
BALT3 4.5501 .2354 19.33 0.000 
PL 2.0706 .2156 9.60 0.000 
EUNew200713 .3748 .1833 2.04 0.041 
RUS 2.8950 .1693 17.10 0.000 
CIS–RUS 2.8071 .1178 –1.60 0.109 
USA 1.0732 .1713 6.27 0.000 
_cons –22.4538 2.2122 –10.15 0.000 
Number of obs = 2402; F (16, 2386) = 1363.15; Prob.>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.6850; Root 
MSE = 1.9088. 
aExports of Latvia to partner j in US-$. 
Source: Eurostat (2016); World Bank (2016); Deutsche Bundesbank (2016); Mayer and Zignago 
(2011); own compilation and calculations. 
Among the country group dummies the close intra-Baltic integration results in 
extraordinarily high coefficients of 4.2, 4.5 and 5.3. These dummies as well as nearly 
all other dummies are definitely positive and highly significant (with the exception of 
the new EU members of 2007 and 2013 for Estonian and for Latvian exports). 
Particularly the Nordic countries are a prime destination of Baltic exports. These 
results underline the perception that the three Baltic States maintain primarily regional 
trade relations while their integration into world markets can still be intensified. 
As a consequence, it is not surprising that the coefficients of the RUS dummies are by 
far higher than those of the UK and the US dummies for all three Baltic States; only 
in the case of Estonia the US dummy shows a slightly higher value than the UK 
dummy. Russia is – at least for the whole observation period and despite tendencies 
of decreasing dependency at the current edge – still a gravity center particularly for 
Lithuanian exports (3.4), somewhat less so for Latvian (2.9) and even lesser for 
Estonia (2.1). But in case of the UK the dummies are also positive and highly 
significant, particularly for Latvia (2.3) and Lithuania (2.6), while the value for 
Estonia is lower (1.2).  
It is not surprising for Estonia and Lithuania that the USA dummies exhibit positive 
and highly significant values as well (EST: 1.16, LIT: 2.0), as their residuals in the 
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all-over-EU-28 gravity (Table 5) indicated more than proportional exports to the 
USA. The focused gravities in this section now show that also Latvia could lose from 
US protectionism, as it exhibits a value of the US dummy (1.07) which is close to the 
Estonian value. Even though Latvia may be exporting to the USA less than 
proportional in the European context the importance of this market appears to be non-
negligible from a national perspective. 
Table 6d: 
Export Gravity Estimates for Lithuania 2000–2015a  
Dependent variable: 
lnXda 
Coefficient β Standard Error t-Value Probability>t 
lnGDPi (Reporter) 1.1474 .0842 13.63 0.000 
lnGDPj (Partner) .7804 .0251 31.03 0.000 
lnPCIj (Partner) .0384 .0378 1.02 0.310 
lnDISTij  –.9466 .0640 –14.79 0.000 
EU15–UKDENORDIC 1.6465 .1427 11.53 0.000 
UK 2.5954 .1772 16.34 0.000 
DE 2.6045 .1594 12.18 0.000 
NORDIC 2.5735 .1716 14.99 0.000 
EUNew2004–BALTPL 1.5452 .1576 9.80 0.000 
BALT3 5.2520 .1954 26.87 0.000 
PL 2.7671 .1960 14.12 0.000 
EUNew200713 1.2327 .1579 7.81 0.000 
RUS 3.4281 .1646 20.82 0.000 
CIS–RUS 3.3572 .1178 –1.60 0.109 
USA 1.9493 .1506 12.94 0.000 
_cons –25.2821 2.0720 –12.20 0.000 
Number of obs = 2429; F (16, 2413) = 1411.65; Prob.>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.7181; Root 
MSE = 1.8460. 
aExports of Lithuania to partner j in US-$. 
Source: Eurostat (2016); World Bank (2016); Deutsche Bundesbank (2016); Mayer and Zignago 
(2011); own compilation and calculations. 
To sum up the results for exports, all three challenges (impaired exports to Russia, a 
hard Brexit as well as US protectionism) turn out to be relevant for the three Baltic 
States. However, the Baltic States’ exports still focus on. Hence, the Baltic States need 
to further adjust their exports to Russia to a normal level as suggested by market size 
and distance – as has already been the case in the last years – in order to alleviate any 
dependence on the large neighbor. Moreover, the less marked but non-negligible links 
to the UK and to the USA show that important alternative destinations for Baltic 
exports exist. But these are endangered by offenses to free trade as well. 
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BSR Imports 
Tables 7a to 7d show the pertinent results for the focused gravity estimates for the 
BSR as a benchmark and then separately for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Starting 
with the whole BSR (Table 7a), the coefficient of the partner countries GDPj is higher 
than in the case of exports (Table 6a), the partners’ PCIj apparently plays even a 
negative role, and the coefficient of the distance variable DISTij is distinctly smaller 
on the import side. These findings may be interpreted by saying that (i) large partners 
play a particular role for Baltic Rim countries as source of imports, (ii) commodities 
are imported from all countries regardless of the their stage of development, (iii) 
imports are coming from definitely more distant sources. Moreover, we observe all 
country dummies to be highly significant at the 1 per cent level and showing greater 
values than those on the export side, with the exception of the US dummy. Apparently, 
the intra-European import intensity is even more pronounced as could be expected 
from the wealth and proximity within Europe. 
Table 7a:  
Import Gravity Estimates for the Baltic Rim EU Members 2000–2015a  
Dependent variable: 
lnMd(a) 
Coefficient β Standard Error t-Value Probability>t 
lnGDPi (Reporter) 1.2840 .0139 92.22 0.000 
lnPCIi (Reporter) –.7307 .0325 –22.48 0.000 
lnGDPj (Partner) 1.2318 .0106 115.83 0.000 
lnPCIj (Partner) –.0399 .0165 –2.42 0.015 
lnDISTij  –.6303 .0314 –20.10 0.000 
EU15–UKDENORDIC 1.9240 .0659 29.20 0.000 
UK 1.0050 .0917 10.95 0.000 
DE 2.1445 .0802 26.75 0.000 
NORDIC 2.8226 .0973 29.01 0.000 
EUNew2004–BALTPL 3.0068 .0671 44.83 0.000 
BALT3 4.4373 .1301 34.12 0.000 
PL 2.8769 .1025 28.08 0.000 
EUNew200713 1.7285 .0697 24.78 0.000 
RUS 2.3954 .1190 20.13 0.000 
CIS–RUS 1.0373 .0891 11.64 0.000 
USA –.7384 .0787 –9.36 0.000 
_cons –35.3485 .4574 –77.29 0.000 
Number of obs = 19371; F (16, 19354) = 5201.50; Prob.>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.7009; 
Root MSE = 2.4756. 
aImports of reporter i from partner j in US-$. 
Source: Eurostat (2016); World Bank (2016); Deutsche Bundesbank (2016); Mayer and Zignago 
(2011); own compilation and calculations. 
Looking at the three challenges which this analysis is focusing on – Russia, Brexit 
and the USA – renders the impression that on the import side impaired imports from 
Russia seem to be the most serious problem. Although imports from the UK exhibit a 
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highly significant and fair coefficient of 1.0 the Russian counterpart nearly reaches 
the threshold of 2.4 for the Baltic Sea Region as a whole (Table 7a). These figures 
mirror the higher dependency on energy imports from Russia. The UK coefficient is 
further downgraded by the smallest size of positive coefficients. Even the coefficient 
for imports from the other CIS countries is higher. The absolute bottom-placed import 
partner country in the context of the model, however, is the USA. On the import side, 
trade flows from the USA to the BSR are clearly less important than the country’s 
economic strength and location would suggest. 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Imports 
On the import side the separate gravities for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Tables 7b 
to 7d) render differences in size with respect to the – in all three cases highest – RUS 
dummy. A more homogeneous picture emerges for the UK and US dummies, which 
mirror the aforementioned results for the whole BSR as well.  
Table 7b:  
Import Gravity Estimates for Estonia 2000–2015a  
Dependent variable: 
lnXd(a) 
Coefficient β Standard Error t-Value Probability>t 
lnGDPi (Reporter) –1.0394 .1096 –9.49 0.000 
lnGDPj (Partner) 1.3581 .0342 39.74 0.000 
lnPCIj (Partner) .0796 .0552 1.44 0.149 
lnDISTij  –.7691 .1001 –7.69 0.000 
EU15–UKDENORDIC 1.7741 .1962 9.04 0.000 
UK .8647 .2999 2.88 0.004 
DE 1.7900 .2864 6.25 0.000 
NORDIC 2.8514 .3444 8.28 0.000 
EUNew2004–BALTPL 3.5398 .1977 17.91 0.000 
BALT3 6.7563 .3386 19.95 0.000 
PL 3.4083 .3220 10.59 0.000 
EUNew200713 2.0175 .2171 9.29 0.000 
RUS 2.7561 .2513 10.97 0.000 
CIS–RUS 3.3242 .2417 13.76 0.000 
USA –1.2393 .2192 –5.65 0.000 
_cons 9.2836 2.5667 3.62 0.000 
Number of obs = 2088; F (15, 2072) = 722.89; Prob.>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.7126; Root 
MSE = 2.4176. 
aImports of Estonia from partner j in US-$. 
Source: Eurostat (2016); World Bank (2016); Deutsche Bundesbank (2016); Mayer and Zignago 
(2011); own compilation and calculations. 
Estonia shows the lowest Russia coefficient (2.8 in Table 7b) which is close to the 
BSR coefficient (2.4 in Table 7a). The Latvian RUS coefficient is somewhat larger 
(3.1 in Table 7c) while the Lithuanian coefficient of 4.3 in Table 7d stands out and 
exhibits the still close relationship of this country with Russia. 
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Quite similar are the still positive coefficients for imports from the UK. They range 
in the interval of .9 to 1.2 which is in line with the pertinent coefficient of 1.0 for the 
whole BSR. They all reflect over-proportional Baltic imports from the UK. 
Table 7c:  
Import Gravity Estimates for Latvia 2000–2015a  
Dependent variable: 
lnXd(a) 
Coefficient β Standard Error t-Value Probability>t 
lnGDPi (Reporter) –.2537 .1047 –2.42 0.016 
lnGDPj (Partner) 1.1283 .0334 33.80 0.000 
lnPCIj (Partner) .2205 .0488 4.52 0.000 
lnDISTij  –.9719 .0968 –10.04 0.000 
EU15–UKDENORDIC 1.8835 .1827 10.31 0.000 
UK .9156 .2295 3.99 0.000 
DE 2.1949 .2373 9.25 0.000 
NORDIC 2.3609 .2859 8.26 0.000 
EUNew2004–BALTPL 3.2888 .2088 15.75 0.000 
BALT3 6.2291 .3242 19.21 0.000 
PL 3.4300 .2835 12.10 0.000 
EUNew200713 2.1379 .2295 9.32 0.000 
RUS 3.0530 .2507 12.18 0.000 
CIS–RUS 3.4317 .1953 17.57 0.000 
USA –.6070 .1926 –3.15 0.002 
_cons –2.9573 2.6469 –1.12 0.264 
Number of obs = 1998; F (15, 1982) = 998.36; Prob.>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.7216; Root 
MSE = 2.2314. 
(a) Imports of Latvia from partner j in US-$. 
Source: Eurostat (2016); World Bank (2016); Deutsche Bundesbank (2016); Mayer and Zignago 
(2011); own compilation and calculations. 
This homogeneous picture is also true for the US dummies. Latvia and Lithuania 
exhibit negative values for the coefficient (–.6) which mirror the value for the whole 
BSR (–.7). Only Estonia shows a negative coefficient which is twice as large (1.2).  
To sum up, the import results render the impression that Russia is the more important 
partner of the Baltic States: Imports from Russia are more important than imports 
from the UK, let alone imports from the USA. At the same time, Russia is more 
important for Baltic imports compared to Russia’s dwindling role as a destination for 
Baltic exports. A coherent picture for both imports and exports is drawn with respect 
to the hierarchy: Lithuania is more dependent on Russia than Latvia, and Latvia is 
more dependent than Estonia. These results thus corroborate the results of the shares 
and of the residuals analyses. Any disturbances in imports from Russia might pose 
bigger problems than losses from decreasing UK deliveries, notwithstanding that the 
latter seem to be important enough to fear losses from a hard Brexit as well. In 
contrast, impaired imports from the USA seem to raise the least concerns. But a 
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looming protectionist regime in the USA would primarily affect Baltic exports, and 
in this respect all three countries are more vulnerable than in the case of imports. 
Table 7d:  
Import Gravity Estimates for Lithuania 2000–2015a  
Dependent variable: 
lnXd(a) 
Coefficient β Standard Error t-Value Probability>t 
lnGDPi (Reporter) –.7114 .1160 –6.13 0.016 
lnGDPj (Partner) 1.2071 .0396 33.51 0.000 
lnPCIj (Partner) .1197 .0572 2.09 0.000 
lnDISTij  –.5854 .0879 –6.66 0.000 
EU15–UKDENORDIC 2.0113 .1879 10.71 0.000 
UK 1.1941 .2420 4.93 0.000 
DE 2.3332 .2526 9.24 0.000 
NORDIC 2.8021 .2883 8.26 0.000 
EUNew2004–BALTPL 3.5408 .2083 17.00 0.000 
BALT3 6.5255 .3009 21.68 0.000 
PL 3.8659 .3256 11.87 0.000 
EUNew200713 2.2830 .2268 10.07 0.000 
RUS 4.2794 .2321 18.44 0.000 
CIS–RUS 3.2457 .2045 15.87 0.000 
USA –.6428 .2259 –2.85 0.002 
_cons 4.6537 2.7382 1.70 0.089 
Number of obs = 2199; F (15, 2183) = 1147.22; Prob.>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.6517; Root 
MSE = 2.5364. 
(a) Imports of Lithuania from partner j in US-$. 
Source: Eurostat (2016); World Bank (2016), Deutsche Bundesbank (2016); Mayer and Zignago 
(2011); own compilation and calculations. 
5. EU Presidency with a Free Trade Agenda  
The trade analysis reveals that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania could be affected 
negatively by all the three challenges to the free movements of goods and services. 
While they are still trading over-proportionally with Russia the attractiveness of UK 
and US markets for Baltic enterprises is already visible and these markets offer further 
development potential. For a number of industries close trade relations can be 
observed despite the relatively small overall export and import shares. Especially for 
the small and vulnerable economies of the Baltic States it is important to avoid 
economic dependencies which could pave the way for political blackmail. In this 
respect free trade creates additional degrees of freedom to find alternative sources of 
supply and sales opportunities. Even a possible boycott of Russian gas deliveries 
becomes less threatening if open markets offer alternative energy sources. Moreover, 
without barriers to trade on world markets, dependencies from particular export 
markets are less likely to emerge. But a lesson still to be learnt by Baltic exporters is 
that only competitive producers can make use of the opportunities of free trade. They 
have to overcome the dichotomy of supplying “technology-intensive” goods to Russia 
and raw material- and labor-intensive goods to Western countries.  
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Against this backdrop, the further development of UK and US markets promises a 
technological up-grade of Baltic export structures and offers an opportunity for 
diversification which would also balance “East-West-Trade” and diminish strategic 
dependencies. Free trade on world markets would foster Baltic efforts to become 
politically and economically more independent from the large neighbor and increase 
the gains from globalization. The Baltic support for free trade agreements with the 
USA and the UK in course of the Brexit would be a logical consequence.  
The Estonian EU Presidency offers the chance to promote the concept of open markets 
in favor of the whole EU. If Estonia would pursue a presidential agenda with a focus 
on free trade it might contribute to bridging political divides which are arising in the 
course of new protectionism, sanctions and EU disintegration  
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Appendix 
Box 1:  
Selected Commodity Groups of the Standard International Trade Classification (Rev. 4) 
SITC 
03 Fish, crustac., molluscs and prep. thereof 
11 Beverages 
24 Wood, lumber and cork 
27 Crude fertilizers and crude minerals 
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials 
33 Petroleum, petroleum products 
34 Gas, natural and manufactured 
35 Electric current 
53 Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials 
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 
55 Essential oils and resinoids etc. 
56 Fertilizers 
57 Plastics in primary forms 
59 Chemical materials and products, n.e.s. 
63 Cork and wood manufactures 
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles 
67 Iron and steel 
69 Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. 
71 Power generating machinery and equipment 
72 Machinery for special industries 
74 General industrial machinery and equipment 
76 Telecommunications apparatus and equipment 
77 Electrical machinery and apparatus 
78 Road vehicles 
79 Other transport equipment including ships 
81 Prefabricated buildings 
82 Furniture and parts thereof 
84 Articles of apparel and accessories 
87 Professional and scientific instruments 
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s. 
9 Commodities and Transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC 
Source: United Nations (2017). 
 
